Facilitating Privacy Conserving Position Proofs for Mobile Users
Keywords:
Location Proof, Privacy, Spatial-Temporal Provenance, Trust.Abstract
With the popularity of social media (e.g., Facebook and Flicker), users can easily share their check-in records and photos during their trips. Location-based services are quickly changing into vastly popular. Additionally to services supported users' current location, several potential services suppose users' location history, or their spatial-temporal provenance. Malicious users could laze their spatial-temporal provenance while not a fastidiously designed security system for users to prove their past locations. In this paper, we present the Spatial-Temporal root age Assurance with Mutual Proofs theme. It is intended for ad-hoc mobile users generating location proofs for every different in a distributed setting. However, it will simply accommodate trusted mobile users and wireless access points. Spatial-Temporal rootage Assurance with Mutual Proofs ensures the integrity and non-transferability of the situation proofs and protects users' privacy. A semi-trusted Certification Authority is used to distribute cryptologic keys moreover as guard users against collusion by a light-weight entropy-based trust analysis approach. Our example implementation on the automaton platform shows that Spatial-Temporal rootage Assurance with Mutual Proofs is affordable in terms of machine and storage resources. Intensive simulation experiments show that our entropy-based trust model is ready to realize high collusion detection accuracy.
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