STAMP : Enabling Privacy-Preserving Position Proofs For Mobile Users

Authors

  • M. Lakshmipathi  Sri Padmavathi Collage Of Computer Science & Technology,Tiruchanoor,A.P, India \Assistant Professor, Sri Padmavathi Collage Of Computer Science & Technology,Tiruchanoor,A.P, India
  • J. Kiran  

Keywords:

Spatial-Temporal provenance Assurance with Mutual Proofs (STAMP), Malicious, privacy preserving

Abstract

Positionbased services are quickly becoming immensely popular. In addition to services based on users' current location, many potential services rely on users' location history, or their spatial temporal provenance. Malicious users may lie about their spatial emporal provenance without a carefully designed security system for users to prove their past locations. In existing, which includes an optimal method for the light setting and an approximate method for the heavy setting. The optimal method leverages vertex grouping and best-first pruning techniques to expedite the mining process. The approximate method can provide the performance guarantee by utilizing the greedy heuristic, and it is comprised of efficient updating strategy, index partition and workload-based optimization techniques. We propose an STP proof scheme named Spatial-Temporal provenance Assurance with Mutual Proofs (STAMP). STAMP aims at ensuring the integrity and non-transferability of the STP proofs, with the capability of protecting users' privacy. Most of the existing STP proof schemes rely on wireless infrastructure to create proofs for mobile users. However, it may not be feasible for all types of applications, we have presented STAMP, which aims at providing security and privacy assurance to mobile users' proofs for their past location visits. STAMP relies on mobile devices in vicinity to mutually generate location proofs or uses wireless APs to generate location proofs. Integrity and non-transferability of location proofs and location privacy of users are the main design goals of STAMP.

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IInternational Journal of Scientific Research in Computer Science, Engineering and Information Technology

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Published

2018-04-30

Issue

Volume 3, Issue 4, March-April-2018

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Research Articles

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How to Cite

[1]
M. Lakshmipathi, J. Kiran, " STAMP : Enabling Privacy-Preserving Position Proofs For Mobile Users" International Journal of Scientific Research in Computer Science, Engineering and Information Technology(IJSRCSEIT), ISSN : 2456-3307, Volume 3, Issue 4, pp.1111-1114, March-April-2018.