Air Gap Penetration

Authors(4) :-Pooja Mudgil, Abhishek Raj, Anmol Biswas, Ravikant Kumar

The issue of data security is very paramount for any organization now a day So through this project we will show how an attacker can steal data from the air –gapped channels and also provide some measures in order to protect data from such type of attacks. Now a day attackers can leak data from isolated, air-gapped computers to nearby smart phones via covert magnetic signals. Attacks have been demonstrated on eavesdropping computer displays by utilizing these emissions as a side-channel vector. The accuracy of producing a screen pic depends on the emission sampling rate and bandwidth of the attackers signal hardware. The cost of radio frequency hardware increased with supported frequency range and bandwidth. A number of affordable software defined radio equipment solutions are currently available satisfying a number of radio-focused attacks at a proper price point. This work investigates that the accuracy influencing factors, other than the sample rate and bandwidth, which are noise removal, image blending, and image quality adjustments, that affect the perfection of monitor image reconstruction through electromagnetic side-channel attacks.

Authors and Affiliations

Pooja Mudgil
Department of Information Technology, Bhagwan Parshuram Institute of Technology, Delhi, India
Abhishek Raj
Department of Information Technology, Bhagwan Parshuram Institute of Technology, Delhi, India
Anmol Biswas
Department of Information Technology, Bhagwan Parshuram Institute of Technology, Delhi, India
Ravikant Kumar
Department of Information Technology, Bhagwan Parshuram Institute of Technology, Delhi, India

Air Gap Computers, Electromagnetic Fields, SDR

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Publication Details

Published in : Volume 5 | Issue 2 | March-April 2019
Date of Publication : 2019-04-30
License:  This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.
Page(s) : 437-442
Manuscript Number : CSEIT1952109
Publisher : Technoscience Academy

ISSN : 2456-3307

Cite This Article :

Pooja Mudgil, Abhishek Raj, Anmol Biswas, Ravikant Kumar, "Air Gap Penetration", International Journal of Scientific Research in Computer Science, Engineering and Information Technology (IJSRCSEIT), ISSN : 2456-3307, Volume 5, Issue 2, pp.437-442, March-April-2019. Available at doi : https://doi.org/10.32628/CSEIT1952109
Journal URL : http://ijsrcseit.com/CSEIT1952109

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